Weak Keys and Immediate Threats
The compromised keys were defective at a level described by engineers as "this should not be possible." While a normal NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, the private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Specifically, the keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, and 237 bits long.
Filippo Valsorda, a cryptography engineer and maintainer for the open source Go programming language, told Ars Technica, "That is extremely in the ‘this should not be possible’ category." Valsorda added, "Maybe some horribly dangerous key generation interface has a ‘size’ parameter and they set it to 1 by mistake???"
Ben Cartwright-Cox, director of BGP.tools, stated, "My guess is that it’s example code that accidentally leaked to production, but hard to know. But it’s bonkers that no one noticed."
The immediate threat involves active adversary-in-the-middle attacks, where an attacker acts as a proxy to intercept and decrypt traffic. This risk is particularly high for VPN users in countries with governments likely to intercept traffic, as well as for users on local networks such as those in coffee shops or universities. There are no reports of certificate transparency logs showing the compromised keys being used maliciously so far.